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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmABSTRACT 
This  paper  employs a  dynamic general-equilibrium model to  analyze  various  schemes for 
simplifying the U.S.  tax  system, such as a uniform tax levied on all  types of  income regardless of 
source, and the elimination of specific tax breaks like the depreciation allowance. Under each scheme, 
the government selects a balanced-budget fiscal policy (consisting of tax rates and the level of public 
expenditures) which maximizes household welfare given the constraints imposed by the particular tax 
system. We find that a uniform tax system does almost as well as a system with separate taxes on labor 
and capital incomes, provided that a depreciation allowance is maintained. Without the depreciation 
allowance, a uniform tax system significantly reduces household welfare, even though marginal tax rates 
are lower under this scheme. The welfare differences between the various distortionary tax systems are 
much smaller than the potential welfare gains from switching to a system of nondistortionary, lump-sum 
taxes. The various tax systems are also shown to display very different behavior for the movement of 
tax  rates and aggregate economic variables over the business cycle. 
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Every year, Congress passes a bill that tinkers in some way  with our tax system. During the 
1980s however, two major tax bills were enacted that fundamentally altered the structure of the federal 
income tax: the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of  1986 (TRA). 
Although many changes to the tax code have been made since ERTA and TRA, the current U.S.  tax 
system derives most of  its basic structure from these two laws. In this paper, we first review the basic 
features of  these tax laws and then construct a dynamic general-equilibrium model to analyze an issue 
which is closely linked to tax reform, namely, tax simplification. Our primary finding is that a simplified 
system which involves a uniform tax levied on  all types of  income does almost as well as  a more 
complicated system with separate tax rates on labor and capital income, provided that a depreciation 
allowance is maintained. 
In 1981, ERTA imposed a dramatic 23 percent, across-the-board cut in all marginal tax rates, 
and reduced the top marginal rate for individual income from 70 to 50 percent. Statutory marginal rates 
were scaled back to levels similar to those that prevailed in 1965. In addition, ERTA introduced new 
incentives for investment and saving, such as an increased investment tax credit, a generous accelerated 
depreciation schedule, and  an  extension to the eligibility rules  for Individual Retirement Accounts 
(IRAs).' ERTA also helped to eliminate "bracket creep" by indexing tax brackets, personal exemptions, 
and the standard deduction for inflation. 
In 1986, TRA brought about the most significant overhaul of the federal tax system since its 
inception in  1913. The act lowered marginal tax rates for individuals and corporations, dramatically 
reduced the number of tax brackets, broadened the tax base by eliminating or reducing many tax breaks, 
and helped to "level the playing field by reducing the dispersion of  marginal tax rates across alternative 
income-producing activities. Also,  the lowering  of  marginal rates reduced  the  attractiveness of  tax 
evasion and tax avoidance activities. Because of these features, TRA was viewed as taking a significant 
step toward the goal of  achieving a simpler, more efficient federal tax system. An  important result of 
'some of the investment incentives in ERTA,  such as the generous accelerated depreciation schedule, were scaled back 
somewhat by  the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). See Economic Report of the President, 1987 and 
1989. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTRA, and one which we will focus on here, was that average marginal tax rates on labor and capital 
income were  brought closer together. The figures in table  1, taken  from Economic Report of  the 
President, illustrate this point.' 
Table 1:  Average Marginal Tax Rates before and after TRA 1986 
Source of  Income  Before TRA  After  TRA 
Labor Income 
Capital Income 
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1987, Table 2-6, page 91. 
TRA also reduced the variation in marginal tax rates within each category of  income. In the 
labor income category, the number of individual income brackets was reduced to only two, set at 15 and 
28 per~ent.~  In the capital income category, TRA eliminated the investment tax  credit (which, under 
ERTA, had applied to equipment but not structures), eliminated the capital gains preference by  taxing 
gains as  ordinary income, decelerated depreciation allowances on real estate, imposed limitations on 
passive business and real estate losses, and phased out the  deductibility of  nonmortgage consumer 
interest. Furthermore, the lowering of personal marginal rates and the top corporate tax rate reduced the 
attractiveness of  tax shelters. 
By imposing a more uniform tax on alternative sources of income, TRA attempted to eliminate 
incentives in the tax code that had directed resources to less productive activities offering high after-tax 
returns. These perverse incentives result in a loss of  output and a reduction in economic welfare. In 
addition, a simpler, more efficient tax system could be expected to contribute to increased compliance 
and lower administration costs. 
In this paper, we examine the issue of tax simplification using a dynamic general-equilibrium 
model which is calibrated to the U.S.  economy. Based on the results of  TRA, tax  simplification is 
%or additional description and analysis of TRA 1986, see Slemrod (1991) and the two symposia in The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Summer 1987 and Winter 1992. 
3~or  high-income individuals, the 15 percent tax bracket and the personal exemption were phased out, creating an implicit 
third bracket, at 33 percent. Before TRA, there were fourteen tax brackets ranging from 11 to 50 percent. In  1990, the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA90) created a new  statutory bracket at 31 percent. OBRA93, enacted in August 1993, added 
two  statutory brackets for high-income individuals. With OBRA93, there are now  five statutory brackets at 15, 28, 31, 36 and 
39.6  percent. See Economic Report of the President,  1994, Table 1-4, p.  34. 
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more complicated system in our model is one in which capital and labor income are taxed at different 
rates. A basic principle underlying TRA was to broaden the tax base by  eliminating tax breaks, thus 
allowing  revenue requirements  to be  met  with  lower marginal rates.  We  capture this principle by 
eliminating the model's only tax break, the depreciation allowance. We compare the uniform tax system, 
with and without the depreciation allowance, to the more complicated tax system. We also compare all 
three  systems to  one that employs nondistortionary, lump-sum taxes. The various tax  systems are 
evaluated in terms of  economic welfare (as measured by  steady-state household utility), output (as 
measured by steady-state GNP), and business-cycle characteristics (as measured by the relative standard 
deviations and cross-correlations of aggregate economic variables). 
Under each scheme, the government chooses a balanced-budget fiscal policy that maximizes 
household  welfare,  given the  constraints imposed  by  the  particular tax  system.  In this  way,  we 
endogenize the choice of fiscal policy, which consists of a set of stationary decision rules for tax rates 
and the level of public expenditures. Our approach differs from that of Cooley and Hansen (1992), who 
evaluate the welfare effects of  various combinations of exogenous tax rates. 
From the perspective of  choosing an optimal fiscal policy, a uniform tax system imposes an 
additional constraint on the government's decision problem, namely, that the tax rate on capital income 
must be equal to the tax rate on  labor income. Because a policy of equal tax rates is available to the 
government, but not chosen, under the complicated system, we  know that the additional constraint is 
binding and thus results in a lower level of household utility than in the unconstrained case. Our aim 
is to quantify this welfare effect and to evaluate the additional impact of the depreciation allowance. 
We find that the difference in welfare between the complicated system and the simplified tax 
system with a depreciation allowance is less than 0.1  percent of  GNP, or $23 per person per year in 
1993. The steady-state output loss associated with this version of the simplified tax system is slightly 
less than 1 percent of GNP. These results suggest that a uniform tax system could actually be welfare- 
improving if sufficient cost saving were realized in the areas of compliance and administration. Without 
the depreciation allowance, a uniform tax system significantly reduces household welfare and steady- 
state output, as compared to both the complicated system and a uniform tax system with a depreciation 
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year in 1993. The output loss is over 4 percent of GNP. Eliminating the depreciation allowance reduces 
household welfare because this tax break operates as an implicit subsidy to capital accumulation, and 
partially  offsets the income tax distortion. This is true even though the marginal tax rate on capital 
income is lower under a system with no depreciation allowance. Because of the government's desire to 
tax profits as much as possible, a high tax rate on capital combined with a full depreciation allowance 
is superior to a low tax rate on capital combined with no depreciation allowance. Our result points out 
the important role played by the depreciation allowance in encouraging capital accumulation. Thus, the 
inflation-induced erosion of unused nominal depreciation allowances, which are carried over from year 
to year in historical cost terms, may impose a significant welfare cost on the U.S.  e~onomy.~ 
Moreover, we find that the welfare differences between the various distortionary tax systems are 
much smaller than the potential welfare gains from switching to a system of nondistortionary, lump-sum 
taxes. Our calculations indicate that distortionary taxes impose a welfare cost exceeding 14 percent of 
GNP. Because of distributional issues and concerns over the perceived fairness of the tax code, we do 
not view  the lump-sum tax  system as a realistic policy option.  However, it does provide  a useful 
benchmark for our analysis. 
Finally,  we  show  that  the  various  tax  systems have  very  different  implications  for  the 
comovement and relative variability of  tax rates and aggregate economic variables over the business 
cycle. Under the complicated tax system, the capital tax moves countercyclically and displays high 
variability because it is used to absorb shocks to the government's budget constraint. In the model, 
budget shocks are caused by changes in the size of the tax base due to business-cycle fluctuations. Under 
the  simplified  tax  system,  government expenditures  are  much  more  variable  because  a  separate 
instrument for absorbing budget shocks is not available. Also, for a given variance of the technology  ~ 
shock, we find that output, consumption, and hours worked are more variable under a system of  lump- 
i 
4~udd  (1989) emphasizes this point  by  treating  the  inflation  erosion of unused  depreciation  allowances as  an  effective 
increase in  the tax rate on capital. See Altig and Carlstrom (1991) for a business-cycle model that incorporates  inflation's effect 
on  the nominal taxation of capital income. Pecorino (1993) examines the  growth effects of the depreciation allowance in  an 
endogenous growth model. 
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tax rates tend to offset the effects of technology shocks, thus resulting in lower output variability. 
The remainder of  this paper is organized in the following manner:  Sections 2 and 3 describe 
the model and the solution method. The choice of parameter values is discussed in section 4. Section 
5 presents quantitative welfare comparisons based on steady-state analysis. In section 6, we examine the 
business-cycle characteristics of the various tax schemes. Section 7 provides concluding remarks. 
2.  The Model 
The model economy consists of  many identical, infinitely lived households, identical private 
firms, and the government. Households derive direct utility from government-provided public goods 
which are financed by  taxes on households and firms. Following Benhabib and  Farmer (1994), we 
assume that firms exert some degree of monopoly power over the production of  intermediate goods so 
that  they  realize  positive  economic  profits  even  though  the  market  for  final  goods  is  perfectly 
competitive. The profits are equal to the difference between the value of  output and the payments to 
labor and capital inputs. The purpose of  introducing profits is to obtain a positive optimal tax rate on 
capital, consistent with U.S.  observation^.^ As owners of the firms, households receive net profits in the 
form of  dividends, but consider them to be outside their control, similar to wages and interest rates. It 
is assumed that profits are initially taxed at the firm level, then distributed as dividends and taxed again 
at the household level. This formulation is intended to capture the double taxation of corporate dividends 
in the U.S. economy. Furthermore, in the complicated tax system, we assume that the government can 
distinguish between labor and capital income, but cannot distinguish between the different categories of 
capital income, such as profits, dividends, and capital rental income. Therefore, the complicated system 
includes only two types of distortionary taxes: a labor tax and a capital tax. 
 ones, Manuelli,  and  Rossi  (1993b)  show  that  the  existence of profits and  a restriction on the  menu of  available tax 
instruments (the absence of a separate profits tax) is one method of obtaining  a positive optimal tax rate on capital in the steady 
state. Without profits, the optimal steady-state tax on capital is zero (see Judd  [I9851 and Chamley [1986]). 
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Households maximize a discounted stream of  within-period utility functions over consumption 
and leisure, subject to a sequence of  budget constraints. The decision problem can be summarized as 
- 
max  {lnc, -Ah, +sing,)  O<p<l,  A, BLO  (1) 
c, .  h, .  k,,,  t-O 
subject to 
kt+,  = (  1  -6 )kt + x,  0 <6 <  1 ,  ko  given. 
In the above equations, c, represents private consumption goods. Households are endowed with 
one unit of  time each period and work h,  hours during period t.  Household preferences also include a 
separable term representing the utility provided by public consumption goods g,. Examples of public 
consumption goods that  might  affect household utility  are national defense, police protection, and 
government provision of food and housing during natural disasters. Public goods are assumed to be non- 
congestable and free of  specific user charges. 
Households maximize the utility function in (1) over c,, and h,, but view g, as outside their 
control. The logarithmic form of the within-period utility function has been chosen for tractability and 
for comparability with previous business-cycle literature. The separability in c, and g, implies that public 
consumption does not affect the marginal utility of private consumption, a specification supported by 
parameter estimates in McGrattan, Rogerson, and  Wright (1993). The symbol E,  is the expectation 
operator conditional on information available at time t, and P is the constant household discount factor. 
The fact that  utility  is  linear in hours worked  reflects  "indivisible labor,"  as described by 
Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985). This means that all variation in economywide hours is due to 
variations in the number of  employed workers, as opposed to variations in hours per  worker.  Real 
business  cycle models with  indivisible labor  are better able to  match  some key  characteristics of 
aggregate labor-market data. Specifically, U.S. data display a large volatility of  hours worked relative 
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Equation  (2) represents the period budget  constraint of  the household. The terms xt and kt 
represent  gross  private  investment  and  private capital, respectively.  Households  derive income by 
supplying labor and capital services to firms at rental rates wt and rt ,  and pay taxes on labor and capital 
income at rates z,  and z,,  respectively. The term Tt represents a lump-sum tax.  An additional source 
of  income is the firms' net profits fit, which are distributed to households as dividends and are taxed 
at the same rate as capital rental income rt  k, .  The term (I z,  6kt represents the depreciation allowance, 
where the parameter (I can be set to either 1 or 0,  depending on whether this tax break is maintained 
in the simplified tax system. Equation (3) is the law of motion for private capital, given a constant rate 
of depreciation 6. Households view tax rates, wages, interest rates and dividends as determined outside 
their control. 
2.2  Household Optimality 
The  Lagrangian for the households' problem is defined as: 
The household first-order conditions with respect to the indicated variables and the associated 
transversality conditions (TVC)  are: 
'see  Hansen (1985), and  Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). 
7 
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t +- 
The government's problem is solved by finding the set of utility-maximizing allocations ct ,  ht 
and k;,,,  such that the household's first-order conditions (5) and budget constraint (2) are satisfied. Given 
these optimal allocations, the government uses the household  equilibrium conditions to recover the 
appropriate tax rates z,  and z,  that will support these allocations in a decentralized economy? 
23 The Firm's Problem 
The firm's problem is based on the model developed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994). A unique 
final good yt is produced out of  a continuum of  intermediate goods y,,  i E  [0,1], using the following 
constant-returns-to-scale technology: yt = [I,'  yi,X dillh, 0 <  x <1.  We  assume that the final goods sector 
is perfectly competitive, but that intermediate goods producers each exert a degree of  monopoly power 
that is captured by the parameter X. In the special case when x = 1, all intermediate goods are perfect 
substitutes in the production of the final good, and the intermediate sector becomes perfectly competitive. 
All intermediate goods are produced using the same technology with labor and capital as inputs: 
yit = exp(zt) kiP1  hi:',  where  O<ai<l,  a,+a,2 1,  (6) 
Zt+l  = PzZt  +&,+I  O<pz<l,  ~,-iid(0,0;),  zo  given.  (3 
Notice that equation (6) allows for the possibility of increasing returns to scale in the production 
7~ee  Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1993) for a more complete discussion of this equilibrium concept 
8 
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which are revealed to agents at the beginning of period t. These shocks generate equilibrium business- 
cycle fluctuations in the model. Due to their monopoly power, producers of intermediate goods earn an 
economic profit which is taxed at the rate z,  . 
Under the assumption that factor markets are competitive, a symmetric equilibrium (k=  kt and 
hit=  ht for all i) implies the following expressions for the aggregate production function (y, =  y, ),  the 
rental rate of capital, and the real wage. 
where  8, = X a,  and  e2 = X a,. 
From (8), the aggregate technology can be rewritten as 
1 
1 
y,  = exp(nt)  [k," hte2]~,  where  (0, + €I2) -  2 1  . 
X 
Depending  on the  value of  X, the  aggregate technology can demonstrate either constant or 
increasing returns to scale. The after-tax profits, distributed to households in the form of dividends, are 
2.4  The Government's Problem 
The government chooses an  optimal program of  taxes  and public expenditures in order to 
maximize  the  discounted  utility  of  the  household.  The  vector  !Pt = { gt ,  z,  ,  z,  ,  Tt )  summarizes 
government policy implemented at time t. This is a dynamic version of the Rarnsey (1927) optimal tax 
problem,  involving  a  Stackelberg game  between the  government and  households.  To avoid time- 
consistency problems, we assume that the government can commit to a set of state-contingent, stationary 
policy rules announced at time zero. Also, to make the problem interesting, we rule out any time-zero 
'see  Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994) for more details regarding this formulation. 
9 
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assume that the government  adheres to a period-by-period, balanced-budget constraint? With these 
assumptions, the government's problem is 
subject to: 
(i)  household  first-order conditions and budget  constraint, 
(ii)  firm  profit maximization conditions, 
(iv)  4  = 1 ,  Tt  = 0,  for the complicated tax  system, 
(v)  T~~ = T  = T~,  @  = { 1  ,  0 ] ,  Tt  = 0,  for the simplified tax  system, 
-  (vi)  T,,  - T,,  = 0,  Tt  = g,,  for the lump-sum  tax  system. 
Constraints  (i) and (ii) summarize rational maximizing behavior on the part of private agents and 
constitute "irnplementability" constraints imposed on the government's choice of policy. Constraint (iii) 
is a general version of the government budget constraint, where the squared term on the right-hand side 
reflects the double taxation of firm dividends. Finally, (iv) through (vi) speclfy the constraints associated 
with  each  of  various tax  systems we  intend to  analyze.  The  summation  of  the household  budget 
constraint (2) and the government budget constraint (iii) yields the following resource constraint for the 
economy: 
Because the resource  constraint and  the government budget constraint are not independent 
'~ddin~  government debt to the model introduces complications that we wish to avoid here. Specifically, equilibrium for 
a model with debt and capital imposes an ex ante arbitrage condition on the expected returns from government bonds and private 
capital. The steady-state  level of debt is thus indeterminate (see Charnley [1985]).  Furthermore, in a stochastic environment, the 
government can vary the ex post combination of the capital tax and the bond interest rate in many different ways to raise needed 
revenue, yet still satisfy ex ante arbitrage (see Zhu 119921 and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe 119931). Excluding government debt 
allows us to pin down a unique time path for the optimal capital tax. 
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3.  Solution of the Model 
The governrnent's problem under commitment can be  solved using the  recursive algorithm 
developed by Kydland and Prescott (1980). A recursive structure is obtained by defining the household 
lagged shadow price h,-,  as a "pseudo-state variable." Including h,-,  in the state vector provides a link 
to the past by which the policymaker at time t considers the fact that household decisions in earlier 
periods depend  on current  policy  by  means  of  expectations. This is the  mechanism by  which the 
commitment problem can be solved using dynamic programming. Appendix A describes the procedure 
for formulating the recursive version of (1  1) and numerically solving the dynamic programming problem. 
4.  Calibration of the Model 
To obtain quantitative welfare estimates from the model, as many parameters as possible are 
assigned values in advance on the basis of empirically observed features of postwar U.S. data. Parameter 
choices are also guided by  the desire to obtain steady-state values for key model variables that are 
consistent with long-run averages in the U.S. economy. Table 2 summarizes the choice of parameter 
values and is followed by a brief description of how they were selected. 
Table 2:  Parameter Set 
Agent  Parameters and Values 
Households  = 0.962  A = 2.50  B  = 0.35 
0,  = 0.31  Firms  6 = 0.07  p, = 0.85  x = 0.91  0,  = 0.60  a, = 0.02 
Government  $={I, 0) 
The time period in the model is taken to be one year. This is consistent with the time frame of 
most government fiscal decisions and the frequency of available data on average marginal tax rates. The 
discount factor of P=0.962 implies an annual rate of time preference equal to 4 percent. The household 
utility parameter A is chosen such that hours worked in the distortionary tax systems is close to 0.3. This 
is in line with time-use studies, such as Juster and Stafford (1991), which indicate that households spend 
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a steady-state value of g/GNP near 0.22, the average ratio for the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1992. 
The exponents in the Cobb-Douglas production function are chosen on the basis of two criteria. 
First, the chosen values of 8, and 8,  are in the range of the estimated shares of GNP received by capital 
and labor in the U.S. economy (see Christian0 [1988]). Second, the model's share of GNP devoted to 
monopoly profits (= 1- 8, - 8,) is chosen to yield a reasonable value for the steady-state tax on capital 
(T~)  in the complicated tax system. Because a separate profits tax is not available, the government uses 
the tax on private capital to recapture a portion of these profits. In the model, the steady-state ratio of 
profits to GNP is 0.09 and the resulting steady-state tax on capital is 0.30. This value of  T~ coincides 
with the average effective corporate tax rate in the United States from 1947 to 1980, as estimated by 
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).1° The monopoly power parameter x is chosen such that the aggregate 
production  technology  demonstrates  constant  returns  to  scale.  The  value  of  x =0.91  yields 
yt = exp (2,) k:34  hp.66. We also experiment with smaller values of X, such that the aggregate technology 
is characterized by  increasing returns to scale. 
The private capital depreciation rate of  6 = 0.07 is based on the value estimated in Braun and 
McGrattan (1993) and is consistent with values commonly used in the real business cycle literature. 
Together with the values of P and €4,  this depreciation rate implies a steady-state ratio of private capital 
to GNP in the range of  2.27 to 3.1 1 for the various tax systems, and a ratio of private investment to 
GNP in the mge  of 0.16 to 0.22. The corresponding averages for the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1992 
are 2.58  and 0.21. 
The process governing technology shocks was estimated using annual data from 1947 to 1992. 
The series for zt was constructed by computing the changes in output not accounted for by changes in 
the productive inputs."  The estimated parameters, p,  =  0.85  and  o,  =  0.02, represent values close to 
1°~igher  profit levels imply  a higher  steady-state tax on  capital in our  model. When  profits  are  zero  (€I,  +€I,=  1). the 
optimal steady-state tax on capital is zero. If  a separate profits tax was available, the government would choose to tax profits at 
100 percent and  ordinary capital income (r, k,) at  zero percent (see footnote 5). 
production function residual was measured as z,  = InGNP, - 0.34hkI  - 0.66hh,. The private capital stock k, is defined 
as fixed private capital + stock of consumer durables + residential capital from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United 
States. U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). Real GNP  and the labor input (h,= LHOURS) are from Citibase. 
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simulations, the estimated value of  o, yields a standard deviation of  output in the range of  1.74 to 2.96 
percent. The U.S.  average over this period is 2.46 percent. 
5.  Steady-State Welfare Analysis 
Based on our choice of parameter values, table 3 shows the steady-state values of  key model 
variables for each of  the various tax systems. Of  the three distortionary tax systems, the complicated 
system has  the highest level of  steady-state utility and the  largest output, followed  closely  by  the 
simplified system with a depreciation allowance. Table 4 indicates that the difference in utility between 
these two systems is less than 0.1 percent of  GNP, which translates to a loss of  $23 per person per year 
in 1993.12 To put this number in perspective, Cooley and Hansen (1991) estimate the welfare cost of a 
5 percent annual inflation to be 0.34 percent of  GNP annually. 
The simplified tax system could actually be welfare-improving if sufficient cost savings were 
realized in the areas of compliance and administration. However, the necessary savings represent about 
9 percent of the estimated total resource cost of  administering the federal tax system.13  Cost savings of 
this magnitude would appear to be very difficult to achieve. Also, the simplified system's lack of  an 
explicit capital tax may be undesirable from the standpoint of  redistributing resources in an economy 
where wealth is highly concentrated in the hands of  rich taxpayers.14 
When the depreciation allowance is eliminated from the simplified system, household welfare 
is reduced by over 2 percent of GNP, or $523 per person per year in 1993. Eliminating the depreciation 
allowance reduces household welfare because it operates as an implicit subsidy to capital accumulation, 
'%his  figure is based on a nominal GNP of  $6,510 billion and a total U.S. population of  258.2 million in 1993. 
13~osen  (1992,  p. 351) estimates the total resource cost of  administering the federal tax system to be $35.3 billion in 1982, 
or 1.11 percent of  1982 GNP. If  we  assume that the ratio of  resource cost to GNP is approximately the same in 1993, and that 
the necessary cost savings to make the simplified system desirable amount to 0.1 percent of  GNP, then the necessary savings 
represent 9 percent (=0.1/1.11) of the total resource cost. 
"?n  the United States, the top 20 percent of  households own about 80 percent of total wealth and earn about 42 percent of 
pretax income. See McDermed, Clark, and Allen (1989). figures 13.1 and 13.2, and Rosen (1992), table 8.1. See Lansing (1994b) 
for an optimal tax model with rich and poor households. 
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income (2,)  is lower under this scheme. Because of the government's desire to tax profits as much  as 
possible (see Jones, Manuelli and Rossi [1993b]), a high tax rate on capital income combined with a full 
depreciation allowance is superior to a low tax rate on capital income combined with no depreciation 
allowance.15 
Table 5 indicates that the welfare effects of tax simplification are much smaller than the potential 
welfare gains from switching to a system of  lump-sum taxation. Under the complicated system, the 
welfare loss from distortionary taxation translates to $3,533 per person per year in 1993. However, our 
representative household framework abstracts from any  distributional role fuKied by  a system of 
distortionary taxes. The lump-sum tax  system should thus be viewed  as a benchmark, but  not  as a 
realistic policy option. 
'%hen  profits are zero  (1-9, -9,=0) and the government can tax  labor and capital income separately, eliminating the 
depreciation allowance has no effect whatsoever on the steady-state allocations. This can be seen from the government's recursive 
problem in appendix A, for the complicated tax system (T,#T,); note that the depreciation allowance parameter I$  only appears 
in the profit term of the (transformed) household budget constraint 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3:  Steady-State Comparison of Tax Systems 
Simplified  Simplified  U.S. 
Variable  Complicated  W/  Depr Allow  No Depr Allow  Lump-sum  Economya 
Utility  -2.764  -2.766  -2.798  -2.547  n.c. 
zh  =  0.27,  0.23  zh  =  0.22  Tax Rate  z = 0.25  z =  0.20  T l  y = 0.23  zk =  0.30,  0.57 
2, =  0.30 
Tly  =0.28 
an.c. =not comparable. The U.S. values for k / y and g / y represent the 1947-92  averages, from Citibase. 
Sources for U.S.  tax rates are as follows: The two values for T, are averages from Barro and Sahasakul(1986), 1947- 
83, and McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993), 1947-87, respectively. The two values for z, are averages from Jorgenson and 
Sullivan (1981, table ll), 1947-80, and McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993), 1947-87, respectively. The value of T/y is the 
average of  total government receipts (federal, state, and local) as a percentage of GNP, 1947-92, from Economic Report  of  the 
Presides, 1994, table B-80, p. 363. 
Table 4:  Effects of Tax Simplification 
Tax System 
Welfare and Output Loss versus Complicated Tax Systema 
Welfare Loss = AUl(5y)  Output Loss = Ay 1  y 
Simplified 
W/  Depr Allowance 
Simplified 
No Depr Allowance 
'AU  and Ay  are normalized using the steady-state values of h and y from the complicated tax system, where h is the 
marginal utility of  private consumption (to convert AU  into consumption units) and y is GNP. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Tax System 
Welfare and Output Loss versus Lump-sum Tax Systema 
Welfare Loss = AU/(hy)  Output Loss = Ay  ly 
Complicated 
Simplified 
W/ Depr Allowance 
Simplified 
No Depr Allowance 
'AU and Ay  are normalized using the steady-state values of h and  y  from the lump-sum tax system, where h is the 
marginal utility of private consumption (to convert AU into consumption units) and y is GNP. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
The welfare costs in table 4 tend to be higher for an economy with increasing returns to scale. 
When x =  0.75, the aggregate production technology is y, =  exp (2,  ) k0.41  hbgO.  In this case, the welfare 
losses in the first column of table 4 become 0.19 percent and 2.69 percent of GNP, respectively, for the 
two simplified systems. 
6.  Dynamic Simulation of Business-Cycle Behavior 
Our simulation results (table 6 and figures 1 and 2) show that the various tax systems have very 
different implications for the comovement and relative variability of tax rates and aggregate economic 
variables over the business cycle. In the model, shocks to the government's budget constraint are caused 
by changes in the size of the tax base due to business-cycle fluctuations. Because we have imposed a 
balanced-budget restriction, government debt is not available to help smooth public expenditures when 
budget shocks occur. In the complicated system, however, the shock absorbing function is performed 
by a state-contingent capital tax, which moves countercyclically and displays high variability relative 
to the labor tax. For example, a positive technology shock generates more tax revenue because GNP and 
household incomes (the tax  base) increase. This motivates  a  reduction in  T~  because  government 
spending requirements can be met using a lower tax rate. Absorbing shocks mainly by changes in T~, 
as opposed to changes is T~,  is efficient because capital is completely inelastic within a given period, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmunlike  labor  supply.16 The  shock  absorbing feature  of  z,  reinforces  the  variability  of  household 
investment, but allows the government to maintain a very smooth series for g,ly,, as compared to the 
other tax systems (see figure 2). Under the two simplified tax systems, the government prefers to absorb 
budget shocks mainly by increasing the variability of g, .  Changes in g, do not affect household decisions 
due to the additively separable way  in which g, enters the household utility function. The government 
maintains a low variability in z,  to reduce fluctuations in household labor supply. Interestingly, the 
simplified tax systems do a better job  of  matching the relatively high standard deviation of  public 
expenditures in U.S. data. In the complicated and lump-sum tax systems, the standard deviation of  g, 
is much lower than the U.S.  value. For these tax systems, it appears that an additional shock is needed 
to increase the variability of government spending.17 
The labor tax  (in the complicated system) and the uniform income tax  (in both  simplified 
systems) are procyclical (table 6b). The government uses these taxes to help smooth households' after- 
tax income from labor. For example, a positive technology shock is accompanied by increases in z,  and 
2,.  This provides households with an implicit insurance mechanism against earnings variability, thus 
leading to lower standard deviations of household consumption and hours worked in the distortionary 
tax systems versus those in the lump-sum tax system (table 6a). 
The model's prediction that the capital tax should display more variability than the labor tax is 
consistent with the U.S.  tax rate estimates we have chosen for comparison.18 The model disagrees with 
the data, however, in predicting a negative correlation between z,  and z,.  The U.S.  tax rate estimates 
16~he  optimality of using a state-contingent  capital tax to absorb budget shocks has been shown previously by  Judd (1989) 
and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1993). Bohn (1988) shows how  nominal public debt can be used to absorb budget shocks. 
17~dding  preference shocks to households' demand for public goods (to simulate wars, for example) would increase the 
variability of g,  in these tax systems. See Lansing (1994a) for an optimal policy model with preference shocks. 
18~igures  3 and 4 display the tax rate series before detrending. For quantitative comparisons (table 6) detrending is necessary 
because the U.S.  labor tax displays a distinct upward trend, while the U.S.  capital tax displays a downward trend. These trends 
have no counterpart in the model. The trend in T,  is possibly linked to the phenomenon of "bracket creep," which existed before 
tax  schedules were indexed for inflation in  1985. Regarding the trend  in T,,  Auerbach  and  Poterba (1988) argue that the 
downward trend  is due to increasingly generous investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation schedules. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmdisplay a positive correlation.19  This suggests there may be rigidities in the U.S. tax code (not accounted 
for in the model) that loosely connect the movement of  capital and labor taxes over the business cycle. 
Explicit modeling of  such rigidities is a topic for our future research. 
Without a depreciation allowance, the simplified tax  system displays wildly  counterfactual 
behavior, predicting negative correlations with output for ct ,  ht ,  and 4.  This behavior can be traced to 
the higher variability of  zt that results from the lack of  a separate tax on capital. The variability of  zt 
is such that  movements  in the  tax  rate  can  actually override the  effects of  technology shocks in 
determining the behavior of  household consumption and inve~tment.~ 
For a given variance of the technology shock, output is more variable under the system of lump- 
sum taxes than under any of the distortionary systems (table 6a). This occurs because movements in the 
distortionary  tax  rates  partially  offset the effects  of  technology  shocks, resulting in  lower  output 
variability. The lump-sum tax system does a reasonably good job  of  matching the relative standard 
deviations of hours and productivity, a feature typical of  indivisible labor models (see Hansen 119851). 
In all three distortionary systems, however, the standard deviation of hours relative to productivity is too 
low, despite the presence  of  indivisible labor. The  insurance features of  the  optimal tax rates  are 
responsible for the reduced variability of  hours in these systems. Similar to the case for government 
spending, our results suggest that an additional shock is needed in the distortionary tax models to 
increase the variability of hours worked. Such a specification would be consistent with the position of 
Aiyagari (1994), who uses a variance decomposition analysis to argue that the behavior of hours in U.S. 
data is driven by  multiple shocks. 
191n the U.S. data,  the  correlation coefficient between (detrended) z,  and z,  equals 0.41, using the  z,  series from  Barro 
and Sahasakul (1986) and  the z,  series from Jorgenson and  Sullivan (1981). The correlation is 0.52 using the z,  and  z,  series 
from McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993). 
''~xce~t  for the double taxation of dividends, the income tax with no depreciation allowance is equivalent to  a production 
tax  which takes the  form j,= (l-z,)exp  (z,)  [k:'  hP]'IX.  A tax  of this  fonn can  be modeled as a negative technology shock. 
See Abel and  Blanchard (1983). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6a:  Business-Cvcle Statistics for the Various Tax Svstems 
Standard Deviation in Percent (all series detrended)a 
Simplified  Simplified  U.S. 
Series  Complicated  w/ Depr Allow  No Depr Allow  Lump-sum  ~conorn~~ 
GNP=y,  2.32  2.34  1.74.  2.96  2.46 
5  5.65, 3.65 
Tax Rates 
zh  4.12  z  4.27  z  7.80  Tly  1.79  2,  16.4,4.82 
z,  11.31 
Tly  2.44 
Table 6b:  Business-Cvcle Statistics for the Various Tax Svstems (continued) 
Contemporaneous Correlation with Output (all series detrended)a 
Simplified  Simplified  U.S. 
Series  Complicated  w/ Depr Allow  No Depr Allow  Lump-sum   cono om^^ 
0.99 
zh  0.37, 0.05 
Tax Rates  z,  6.96  z  0.99  z  0.99  Tly  6.91  z,  0.10,  0.32 
Tly  0.14 
aModel statistics are means over 100 simulations, each 46 periods long, after dropping the first 50 periods. Parameter 
values are from table 2. All series were logged and detrended (except for tax rates which were only detrended) using the Hodrick- 
Prescott Nter (see Prescott [1986]). The filter smoothing parameter was set at A=  100 since all data are at annual frequency. 
b~.~.  data cover the  period  1947  to  1992.  The  following  quarterly series from  Citibase were  annualized before 
computing statistics: y, = GNPQ, c, =  GCDQ+GCNQ (nondurables and  services), g, =  GGEQ, h, =  LHOURS (household survey), 
y, 1  H,  = GNPQLHOURS. The series for x,is fixed business investment + consumer durables expenditures +residential investment. 
The series for k, is fixed private capital + stock of consumer durables + residential capital. Both x, and kt are annual series from 
Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, U.S. Department of  Commerce (1993). Sources for U.S.  tax rate data 
are described in the notes to table 3. All series were logged (except tax rates) and detrended as in the model. 
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While  our model is  admittedly a very  abstract and  simplified representation  of  the  vastly 
complex  U.S.  tax  code, we  believe  that  it  can be  useful  for examining  key  questions  about the 
institutional structure of  our tax system. In our view, the strength of  the model lies in the ability to 
capture the general-equilibrium effects of  endogenous fiscal policy. Using this approach, we  find that 
a uniform tax on all types of income yields almost the same welfare as a more complicated system with 
separate tax rates on labor and capital income. We also find that the depreciation allowance plays an 
important role in encouraging capital accumulation. In a related paper (see Guo and Lansing [1994]), 
we  extend our examination of  various tax structures to include an analysis of  single versus double 
taxation of  firm dividends. 
In general, we find that the assumed structure of the tax system can have profound effects on 
the characteristics of  optimal fiscal policy and the resulting behavior of  aggregate economic variables 
over the business cycle. Although our model abstracted from economic growth, we  expect that tax 
structure would continue to have a significant impact in a model where growth is endogenous. Jones, 
Manuelli, and Rossi (1993a) employ an endogenous growth model to derive optimal fiscal policy with 
separate taxes on labor and capital, and no depreciation allowance. They also examine a case where tax 
rates on labor and human capital are restricted to be the same, but physical  capital is taxed separately. 
In our current research, we are performing tax simplification experiments similar to those done here in 
the context of an endogenous growth model (see also Pecorino [I9931 and Stokey and Rebelo [1993]). 
Our work thus far agrees with the viewpoint of Slemrod (1990), who argues that selecting an optimal 
tax structure can often be more important than the setting of optimal tax rates. 
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A.l  Recursive Formulation of the Government's  Problem 
To formulate the recursive version of the government's problem specified in equation (1  I), we 
first substitute the household first-order conditions (5) into the household budget constraint (2), the 
resource  constraint (12), and  the  utility  function  U(.)  to eliminate z,,  z,,  and  c, .' The resource 
constraint  (12) can  then be  used  to  substitute out g,. For  the  lump-sum tax  system, we  use  the 
household  first-order conditions to eliminate r,, w,,  and  c,; the  government  budget  constraint to 
eliminate  T, ; and  the  resource  constraint  to  eliminate g, .2 The vector  of  state  variables  for  the 
government's  problem in period t is s,={z,,  kt, h,,]. In the transformed problem, the government's 
decision variables are h,  ,  h, ,  and k+,  . Using primes (') to denote next-period quantities, the recursive 
version of  the government's problem is shown in (A.1). 
The Bellman equation in (A.1) summarizes the recursive nature of the problem The first two 
constraints  represent  two  versions  of  the  household  budget  (after  substituting  in  the  first-order 
conditions), depending on whether distortionary or lump-sum taxes are used. The next constraint imposes 
the condition of  equal tax rates on labor and capital for the simplified tax system. The symbols u,, and 
u,  represent composite error terms that arise due to the presence of  E, in the first-order condition for 
kt+,.  The remaining constraints define the production technology, the factor prices r, and w,  ,  and the law 
of  motion for the exogenous technology shock. 
The dynamic programming problem applies for all t >  0. The problem at t =  0 must be considered 
separately, as shown by Kydland and Prescott (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Charnley (1986). 
At t =  0, the stock of  private capital is fixed. Optimal policy thus implies a high initial tax on capital to 
take full advantage of  this nondistortionary source of  revenue. We assume that this form of lump-sum 
taxation is insufficient to finance the entire stream of  future expenditures. The analysis here will focus 
'Due to the presence of the expectation operator in  the first-order conditions for k ,+,  the substitution is accomplished using 
the  expression E .,  f ,(a)  = f, (-)  - u,, where f ,(.)  is a function of random variables and ,u, is the forecast error. The assumption 
of rational expectations implies E ,.,u, = 0. 
2~ue  to  the presence of monopoly profits in  our model, the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Therefore, the 
government's problem with lump-sum taxes must be solved in  the same manner as the problem with distortionary taxes. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmon policy  in stationary stochastic equilibrium, i.e.,  when  t approaches infinity. The linear-quadratic 
approximation method used to solve (A.l) is accurate only in the neighborhood of  the deterministic 
steady-state. Consequently, we  do not solve the t=O problem or compute the transition path to the 
stationary equilibrium. 
v(s) = ma.  E,{  U(  .) + fl [v(st)  I s]} 
k',  h. 5 
where  s  =  {z, k,  h-l } 
U(.) =  In(l/h) -Ah + Bln 
subject to 
2 
Ah  A-1  -  + -k  + (l-01-02)y  -  -kt+u, =O  1  (for the distortionary 
h  flh  r-$6  x  tax systems) 
Ah +Ih-' -1+6]k  - (0,+0,)y  +ul = 0  (for the lump-sum  -x-  m  tax system) 
A  -  uZ=O  (for the simplified 
wh  r-$6  tax  system only) 
Equilibrium is defined as a value function V(s) and an associated set of  stationary decision rules 
that satisfy (A.l). The decision rules dictate a set of  household allocations and prices at time t  that can 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbe implemented by  means of the government's chosen policy. The government's explicit policy rules 
for tax rates and public expenditures are recovered by  substituting the implementable allocations and 
prices into the applicable first-order conditions and budget constraints. 
A.2  Computation Procedure 
The dynamic programming problem in (A. 1) is solved numerically using a variant of the linear- 
quadratic approximation technique first used by Kydland and Prescott (1982). An  approximate version 
of  (A.l)  is  obtained by  first substituting as many  nonlinear constraints as possible  into the  return 
function U(.).  For constraints that cannot be substituted in, a Lagrange multiplier is used to incorporate 
the constraint into a redefined return function, and the multiplier is treated as an additional decision 
variable. A quadratic approximation of the return function is then computed in terms of  the logarithms 
of  all  variable^.^  The solution algorithm exploits the certainty equivalence property of  linear-quadratic 
control problems. The optimal decision rules for the approximated economy can be obtained by solving 
the deterministic version of  the model4 An  initial guess Vo is made for the optimal value function V(s) 
in  the  quadratic version  of  (A.l).  Sequential candidate  value  functions  Vi  are then  computed  by 
successively iterating on the Bellman equation until the value function has converged. We verified that 
the algorithm always converged to the same value function regardless of the initial guess for Vo. Once 
the process has converged, log-linear decision rules that dictate household equilibrium allocations are 
computed. Log-linear policy rules for z,  ,  z,  (or 7,) and g,  can then be computed using the household 
first-order conditions and the budget constraints, log-linearized around the steady state. 
3~he  log-linear version of the Kydland-Prescott method is described in Chrktiano (1988). 
4 See  Sargent (1987, p. 36). Specifically, the stochastic terms E,, u,, and u,  are set equal to their unconditional means (zero) 
in the numerical  algorithm. With  a quadratic objective, the first-order conditions  are linear  in all variables. This allows  the 
expectation operator in (A.l) to be passed through the expressions, dropping out any stochastic terms. 
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